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Striking a Balance: Administrative Law Judge
Independence and Accountability
By R. Terrence Harders
Modem administrative litigation reveals a number of
considerations for all concerned. From the establishment of a customs
service and a disability pension board for Revolutionary War veterans
in 1789, American regulatory law and its consequent adjudication have
grown steadily through the intervening years. In the decade before
World War I, "[t]he focus changed from enabling organized action to
injecting more public management or supervision of affairs and
providing more sustained, specialized means of defining and enforcing
public policy.'
The dawn of the New Deal era in the first half of this century
brought a proliferation of government agencies and another growth
spurt of administrative adjudication to enforce regulatory compliance.
As administrative litigation grew from the rare occurrence in early
American history to the ubiquitous influence that it is in modem
everyday life, the need for a system of administrative enforcement and
administrative decisions on individual rights and privileges, which can
be seen to be fair and even-handed, has increased. The American Bar
Association (ABA) formed a special committee on administrative law
as the volume of federal administrative litigation under the New Deal
was exploding onto the scene in 1934. The ABA complained at the
time that "the judicial branch ...is being ...undermined" by
administrative adjudication. The ABA's committee, in turn,
condemned "(a) the combination of judicial with executive or
legislative functions; (b) the fact that the tenure of administrative judges
is insecure; and (c) the lack of effective independent review or judicial
control over administrative decisions."2 By 1938, the committee had
identified what it termed 'ten tendencies' of administrative agencies."
The committee included, among others, the tendencies "to decide
without a hearing, to hear one side only, to decide on evidence not
'KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, 8 (3d ed. 1994)(Quoting JAMES WILLARD HEARST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
THE UNITED STATES, 35-41(1977)).
21d. (Quoting 61 A.B.A.R. 720 (1936)).
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produced, [and] to make decisions on the basis of preformed opinions
and prejudice, etc."' Though the ABA committee's recommendation
that Congress establish an Article-III administrative court to replace
virtually all agency rulings has not to come to pass, such was the
context in which the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) arose
after World War II.
The APA has served as the model from which federal
administrative process springs and which many states have copied to a
lesser or greater extent. The drafters of that act expressly balanced a
perceived need for public confidence in administrative adjudications
not subject to political and other outside influences and the vigorously
asserted interest of agencies to ensure effective production from all of
its employees, including administrative adjudicators. Nevertheless, in
the years following the act's passage, the status of agency hearing
officers continued to be a source of controversy. The ABA
Administrative and Regulatory Practice Section is starting a five-year
review of the APA after its fifty years to see what changes should be
made, perhaps based on the experience of the several states.
In the early 1950s, former President Herbert Hoover was
appointed to head a Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government (hereinafter Hoover Commission) to address
problems still existing under the APA. A task force of the Hoover
Commission in its second incarnation once again raised the possibility
of establishing a federal administrative court to take over the
adjudication then being carried out by various agencies. The subject of
administrative agency adjudication remained a part of the larger debate
on the reform of administrative process through the 1960s. Rather than
to remove adjudicatory authority from the agencies, however, Congress
in 1976 amended the APA to allow that the United States be named as
defendant and that judgments other than for money damages could be
brought before agency adjudicators.4 Professors Davis and Pierce
explain that the recognition in the past twenty years that the formulation
of public policy is a political function has served to provide impetus for
greater presidential and congressional attention to activities of
administrative agencies. Significantly, they cite that each of the past
'Id. (Quoting 63 A.B.A.R. 331, 346(1938)).
41d. at 22.
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five presidents has attempted to exert increasing controls over
administrative agencies.'
I am mindful that an active debate about the degree of
independence appropriate for administrative law judges continues
within and among the NAALJ and other professional organizations and
that, in fact, some question whether there is any need for an
independent administrative judiciary, though the movement which
sought to replace it with an Article-III administrative court seems to
have expired. Much of the steam that drove that movement originated
in the notion that, under the Constitution, administrative agencies could
not adjudicate common-law claims. The Supreme Court's 1986
decision upholding the adjudicatory power of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission essentially wrote paid to such attempts.6 The
Court expressly reasserted in its decision of that case its refusal "to
adopt formalistic and unbending rules" with respect to legislative
actions to delegate adjudicatory functions to administrative officers.7
There remains, however, the question of how such adjudicatory powers
are apportioned within the agencies and to what extent agency officials
who make rules and enforce them may take part in or influence the
judging of disputes. A 1986 note in the George Washington Law
Review contains the following astute observation:
[F]rom the perspective of the agency, the right to review
ALJ's decisions [on appeal] supplies insufficient
control. Review permits only an after-the-fact
correction of a single decision, and, though dislike of
reversal undoubtedly shapes ALJs' decisions, it does
not normally modify behavior as effectively as the
choice between conforming to a given norm and
suffering direct adverse consequences.'
Accordingly, many non-judicial-and to be fair, some judicial-agency
1Id. at 24-25.6Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct.
3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675(1986).
1478 U.S. at 851.
IL. Hope O'Keeffe, Note, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation,
and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54
GEO. WASH. L. REv.591, 594 (1986).
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officials take issue with the very premise that administrative
adjudicators need or deserve any independence from direction, control,
and discipline of the agencies they serve. Administrative adjudicators
are, to those who take this tack, nothing more than employees whose
job it is to help the agency make decisions with respect to individual
cases arising under statutes and regulations over which the agency has
charge, either by making decisions on the agency's behalf or by
gathering and reporting facts and recommending a result to those who
make the agency's decisions. Under this view, the administrative
adjudicator's function is not much, if any, more judicial than state
employees who administer driving tests. The agency needs someone
to make decisions on entitlement, responsibilities, and infractions, and
the administrative law judge performs that task. He or she does nothing
more or less than that.
Striking a proper balance requires that we understand the
function and role of the courts, administrative agencies, and
administrative adjudicators. The role of the judicial branch in
American government is to provide a check to the political branches.
This is true both in the federal government, where judges have life
tenure and salary protection, and in the state governments, whether
judges face partisan or retention election. The executive and legislature
are designed to respond to the political winds blowing through the
jurisdiction; the judicial branch serves as a windscreen by requiring that
the other branches operate within the bounds set by the state or federal
constitution and other properly established laws. Therefore, an attack
on the courts strikes at the heart of the system of checks and balances
upon which American democratic government was founded. Executive
agency administrative decisions are then subject to review in the courts.
It must therefore be admitted that a consideration of the need for
administrative law judge independence does not take on the same
gravity as that for judicial independence in the courts.
Though all of the branches at least arguably establish
government policy, it is generally accepted that the political branches,
the executive and the legislature, are the most appropriate venues for
setting policy. Administrative agencies, in accordance with mandates
and guidance from the legislature, tune and shape policy through rule-
making and decision-making. To the extent that administrative law
judges, in deciding cases concerning enforcement and disputes, pass on
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the validity of agency statutory interpretation and rules, administrative
law judges take upon themselves the role of the courts and stand,
potentially at least, in the way of agency policy-making. A general
disagreement on statutory interpretation between top agency officials
and the adjudicators who make decisions for the agency could, if the
adjudicators were truly independent, block agency policy-making
without review in the judicial branch. The different place and overall
role of administrative adjudicators from that of judges in the judicial
branch are what make the contemplation of their independence and
accountability a thornier issue.
Judicial-branch judges in most American jurisdictions have
varying degrees of insulation from adverse action resulting from their
decisions in analyzing government action and interpreting the law.
Were it otherwise the judicial branch's checks and balances on the
political branches would wax and wane in accordance with the whim
of the person or entity which had the power to act against judges in
reaction to their judgments. The same thing can naturally be said of
administrative law judges, but their function as decision-makers for the
executive agencies changes the context of the debate about their
independence and accountability. Other employees in the executive
branch are subject to adverse action if they do not perform their duties
in accordance with the external and internal policies of the agency.
Virtually all of them enjoy legal safeguards which protect them from
arbitrary, vindictive, or illegal adverse action. For those who see
administrative adjudicators as making decisions in a similar fashion to
that of other agency employees, there is no reason that administrative
adjudicators should enjoy any higher degree of protection.
However, the argument that an ALJ is merely making a decision
on behalf of the agency does not lead ineluctably to a conclusion that
the ALJ need not be independent of influences apart from duly enacted
and applicable law and rationally determined facts. We must not lose
sight, though, of the reason that some measure of independence is
desirable and appropriate. The independence of administrative law
judges is not for the benefit of the individual who happens to occupy
that office. Rather it is a way of serving an important public interest.
The public can properly expect that judges in the judicial branch will
ensure that facts will be determined from lawfully admitted evidence
and that courts' rulings will apply to those facts only laws which are
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enacted and enforced in accordance with the constitutions and other
superior authority. The public has a similar interest in having
confidence that agency decisions will also be based on a rational
application of known law and articulated facts. Nor is this conclusion
weakened by the assertion that the agency head has the authority and
indeed the duty to formulate and carry out the agency's policies.
American notions of law and due process require that such binding
policy be publicly recorded and announced before it can be applied or
imposed.
In contrast to those who see no need for administrative law
judge independence are those who suggest that administrative law
judges should be subject to evaluation, guidance, and discipline, if at
all, only from other judicial officers, either within the agency or in a
central hearing organization of some kind. The United States Army, for
instance, has a separate command structure for its military judges, who
preside over courts-martial. Many, if not most, of those judges, once
so designated and assigned, spend the rest of their careers in that
command and are never directly evaluated or disciplined by anyone
other than another judge.
, Military judges are, however, regularly evaluated on the
performance of their duties as are all Army officers. Judge Young and
Judge Felter have made strong arguments in the pages of this journal
that any system of ranking or preferment has measurably negative
effects upon the productivity, quality, and of course independent
thought of ALJs.9 Judge Young has described the need for a system,
with all the trappings of due process, by which incompetent or unethical
judges can be disciplined or removed; however, she has argued that
factors which put individual judges above or below their peers will
unavoidably encourage behaviors which maximize one's appraisal and
speed one's advancement without regard to the merits of individual
parties or legal nuances.'°
Still others suggest that administrative law judges should be
9Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation ofALJs: Premises, Means, and Ends, 17 J.
NAALJ I (Spring 1997); Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Maintaining the Balance between Judicial
Independence and Judicial Accountability in Administrative Law, 17 J. NAALJ 89 (1997).
"°Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation ofALJ's: Premises, Means, and Ends, 17 J.
NAALJ 1, 55 (1997).
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absolutely free from influences outside established substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary rules duly promulgated. A party appearing
in an administrative proceeding should, according to this school of
thought, be confident that the judge who will make the decision in his
or her dispute has no interests or influences of any kind which will
interfere with a full and fair hearing and an objective adjudication of the
matter. However, merely freeing the administrative adjudicator from
adverse action imposed by the agency does not necessarily lead to the
goals expressed. The great fifteenth and sixteenth century thinker,
Desiderius Erasmus, proclaimed that we cannot have a civilized society
unless we have civilized individuals. So, a system of administrative
adjudication does not become visibly fair because the administrative
adjudicators have no external fetters. A sound system of administrative
litigation must have competent, disinterested adjudicators with
integrity, and perhaps more importantly, the members of society must
feel that the system has integrity and does not play favorites among
parties and that the decision-makers do not act on whim. Unless those
who come into contact with the administrative judicial system see its
workings as sensible in light of the law and facts and sensitive to the
mix of interests to be served, society at large will not trust
administrative law judges to give them justice.
Several things bear upon the reality of integrity and fairness and
upon its perception by the public. The consideration of unpublished or
informal agency goals or agency objectives, however they may be
labeled and however they may be expressed, poses a troubling question
in the context of administrative litigation. As noted above, the
decision-maker in an administrative dispute must have the ability and
the integrity to weigh the evidence effectively and to apply the law,
whether it be statutory, regulatory, or decisional, to the facts the
admissible evidence shows. Unless the agency has published its policy
goals in accordance with established rule-making procedures, one must
question whether the agency can have any such goals which an
administrative law judge can rightly take into consideration. To the
extent that administrative agencies jealously guard their ability to
control the work of administrative law judges through supervision,
discipline, and evaluation of their work product in order to reach
unpublished agency goals or to enact unpublished agency policy, those
agencies engage in rule-making in the shadows, hiding from other
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participants in the process in what manner they intend to interpret and
enforce the published law."
The effort to control the process in this manner is almost
inescapably self-defeating. Those subject to the law of the agency will
be dissatisfied with a system which they believe is subject to
manipulation by the agency, which is often a party in fact, if not in law.
Parties have often expressed their sense of futility in having a hearing
with an administrative law judge who is an employee of the very
agency with which they have disputes. Many assume under the best of
circumstances that they cannot get effective review under such a
system. When further review within an agency does not consistently
conform to published precedent, the problem intensifies. As Judge
Felter has put it, the achievement of agency goals is "best done in an
atmosphere where judicial independence is not called into question."12
We have examined and considered the concept of administrative
law judge independence; let us now turn our attention more closely to
the balancing concept of accountability. One can with equal vigor
assert that the achievement of agency goals is best done in an
atmosphere in which the competence and integrity of administrative
iawjudges is also not subject to serious question. The members of the
administrative judiciary, in every jurisdiction and in every agency, owe
a duty to themselves, to their agencies, and to the public at large to
insist of themselves and of their colleagues work of the highest caliber
and ethics which give no hint of improper dealing or unfair
consideration of the rights and responsibilities of the parties who come
before them. To the extent that the administrative judiciary does not
police itself it becomes subject or risks discipline imposed from
without. Administrative law judges, in other words, should be the first
to call to account their peers who fall short and risk the respect and
public support for the administrative judiciary.
Nor can agency officials be expected to stand idly by while an
admittedly few administrative law judges, either through laziness or
I 'The problem has grown particularly acute as proceedings have shifted
increasingly to the adjudication of claims against the agencies which employ the
administrative law judges. See, e.g., Victor W. Palmer, The Administrative Procedure Act:
After 40 Years, Still Searching for Independence, JUDGES' J., Winter 1987, 34 at 37-38.
2Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Maintaining the Balance between Judicial Independence
and Judicial Accountability in Administrative Law, 17 J. NAALJ 89, 93 (1997).
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incompetence, turn out inadequate work, either in volume or quality.
Officials in the political branches are, by design, answerable to the
public. While there is some wisdom to the assertion that the job of
adjudicating cases cannot be objectively measured, it is too easy an
assertion to make. The interest in accountability is, as is the interest in
independence, grounded in serving the public good. The rights of the
parties should be subject to the whims of the ALJ no more than to those
of the agency. Accordingly, there ought to be formal accountability for
administrative law judges as there is for other public officers and
employees. It does not follow, however, that the kind and degree of
accountability must be identical to that imposed on other public
servants.
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
function of the administrative adjudicator has much in common with
that of the members of the judicial branch. 3 Certainly those who come
before administrative law judges recognize that the deciding of
disputes, the prescribing of duties, and the recognition of entitlement
affects them in much the same way that litigation plays out in courts of
law. The paradoxical position of the administrative adjudicator is that
the agency wants to control him or her and parties want him or her to
make decisions which are supported by the known law and facts for the
same reason: adjudication in the agency affects the policies of the
agency.
Finally, while the caliber, training, and ethics of administrative
law judges must be high, other staffing considerations affect how the
system works and how those outside the agency view it. To be capable
of effective judgment of regulatory and other administrative matters,
those who judge must deliver a product of high quality.
Correspondingly, those who come into contact with administrative
litigation are more likely to think highly of the system if results are
swift and clearly understood. Administrative law judges can and do
enhance each other's professionalism through peer education and
publication of scholarly articles, but equipment and paraprofessional
staffing can be more visible and more immediately helpful. Staffing
has a great deal to do with whether administrative adjudication is seen
3Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
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as competent and responsive. Clerical staffing makes an immeasurable
difference in the perceptions of the public, since the staff interacts more
directly with participants in the process and ensures the immensely
important factor of timeliness. Adequate recording and transcription
and word-processing capability and providing adequate legal research
tools and staffing ensure the prompt, accurate, and meaningfully
reviewable decision of administrative cases.
The improvement of an administrative judicial system and the
maintenance of those improvements also require legislative and
executive commitments. The legislature must commit itself to a "good
government" approach to the concerns of those inside and outside the
field of administrative litigation. Reform of existing laws and rule-
making authority to improve the accomplishment of administrative
adjudication should be seen as a legislative priority. Both legislators
and non-judicial administrators must commit themselves to keeping
hands off the day-to-day adjudicatory operations. Frequent attempts by
agency officials to make ex parte contact with adjudicators, however
innocent the intent, give rise to the appearance of interference in the
outcome.
Perceptions of incompetence, indifference, and bias arise from
sources other than ex parte contacts and agency evaluation of
administrative law judges. The administrative judicial process itself
can affect the ability of its judges to make informed and timely
decisions. The extent to which there is an orderly and even-handed
discovery process allows the administrative law judge to have as much
reliable evidence as is feasible for an administrative proceeding.
Similarly, it must be clear whether the administrative law judge has
subpoena power in any real sense. Not only the issuance of subpoenas
but also their enforcement must be efficient and effective. The system
can easily handle enforcement of subpoenas against parties; appropriate
sanctions can be applied through the adjudicative process. ALJs
normally have authority to impose sanctions such as estoppel or
dismissal in such cases to give force to their judicial acts. However,
when nonparties are involved, most often neither the money amounts
at stake, the parties involved, nor the perceived gravity of
administrative adjudication is sufficient to induce police or prosecutors
to enforce an administrative law judge's subpoena. To have authority
to issue subpoenas is of questionable value, if there is no mechanism to
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enforce them. Unenforceable subpoenas work ultimately to degrade the
system as repeat players learn that they can simply ignore them. In
turn, parties who seek the subpoena feel that the system does not work,
especially if the ultimate outcome is not in their favor.
To the extent that members of the bar practice before an
administrative tribunal, they should be encouraged, if not required, to
be conversant with the procedural and substantive provisions of the
applicable statutes and rules. Another thing that distinguishes
administrative litigation from that in the courts today is their higher
volume of pro se practice. Those who represent themselves often do
not understand either the procedural formalities or legal niceties of the
litigation. Easily accessible assistance in preparing their presentations
in advance of hearing make it easier for the judge to unravel the
evidentiary knots and for pro se participants to appreciate understand
and respect what the judge is doing. The agency or department which
has responsibility for the litigation should emphasize to all involved
that swift, fair, and impartial administration is paramount.
Those who dispense administrative justice in the future are
likely to face even greater challenges in an increasing volume of cases
and ever-greater demands for speed in disposition. To function
effectively in the face of those challenges, administrative law judges
will need an organization which at once insulates them from improper
outside influences and holds them accountable for the volume and
quality of their work. Supervision of adjudicators by agency or
department officials whose acts or decisions are the subject of litigation
virtually guarantees that the system of administrative litigation will be
seen as biased and unreliable. A separate administrative judicial agency
with a strictly judicial chain of control and review helps to modify this
perception. Similarly administrative law judge decisions must remain
subject to review, as are the decisions of courts. Whether review is
strictly of the record or is a de novo proceeding, the reviewing tribunal
must consist of members whose qualifications, ethical restraints, and
disinterest in the outcome are at least equal to those whose decisions
they are reviewing. Final review of administrative judicial decisions in
the courts, meanwhile, reinforces the integrity and professionalism of
administrative case adjudication.
The most important element in the balance of administrative
judicial independence and accountability is the administrative law judge
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himself or herself. Administrative law judges must expect to be held
to the highest professional and ethical standards by the executive
branch, the courts, their peers, and the public. As Judge Ann Marshall
Young put it, "it is important for judges to become as aware as possible
of our own biases, prejudices, propensities, and ways of knowing and
thinking, in order to avoid allowing these to improperly influence
outcomes in the cases that come before us."' 4 As those who do not
effectively govern themselves invite government from without,
administrative law judges must demand the highest standards of
themselves and their colleagues. There is an understandable human
reaction to view criticism of peers as criticism of the entire system and
its adjudicators. This reaction must be resisted; administrative law
judges should be as prepared to handle complaints against their
colleagues as they handle other disputes, weighing the available
evidence and deciding the issue as impartially as possible. Within each
jurisdiction, an active peer review organ can help to ensure those who
are most knowledgeable and experienced in administrative litigation
resolve complaints against ALJs, but as Judge Young's remark implies,
it cannot take the place of self-examination and self-discipline. Once
again, education plays a crucial role. ALJs can more easily continue,
as they have for decades, to meet high professional and ethical
standards if they have access to education and professional scholarship
on the substantive, procedural, and ethical issues with which they are
faced every day.
The volume of administrative litigation has grown immensely
in recent decades, and the press of cases is likely to continue to increase
with each passing year. The need to upgrade the administrative judicial
system is urgent. Society has a right to expect that the administrative
adjudication of cases, which has become such a large portion of
litigation overall, will come from impartial judges who are at the same
time subject to appropriate review.
The values and standards of American justice should be evident
at all levels of American jurisprudence and in all fields in which the
government imposes public policy. In adjudicating private rights and
interests in the context of public policy, we cannot ensure that those
"
4Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation ofAdministrative Law Judges: Premises,
Means, and Ends, 17 J.N.A.A.L.J. 1, 25(1997).
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values and standards are upheld while the professional fate of decision-
makers is subject to the whim of a party-in-interest. Having said that,
one must equally recognize that administrative litigation cannot prosper
if there is no check on the adjudicators.
In conclusion, it is in the interests of agency officials, of
administrative law judges, of the courts, of the legislatures, and, in
particular, of the public that administrative law judges are seen to
exercise reasoned judgment governed only by inferences drawn from
evidence properly offered and admitted and by laws duly enacted and
published. Working together, those who have direct responsibility for
the various systems of administrative adjudication can continue the
process of improving how disputes and rights are determined in the
administrative agencies which has been underway for the past sixty-five
years.

